Get exclusive CAP network offers from top brands

View CAP Offers

Thiefware update

[bsa_pro_ad_space id=2]
  • This topic is empty.
Viewing 1 post (of 1 total)
  • Author
    Posts
  • #587914
    Anonymous
    Inactive

    From my mailbox:

    * Spyware legislation in Congress. Rep. Bono’s “Securely Protect Yourself
    Against Cyber Trespass Act” purports to be tough, and it still seems to have
    considerable momentum. But my analysis suggests it’s actually quite a weak
    bill — letting many misleading installation methods continue, and granting
    enforcement only to the FTC (which so far has been notoriously slow to take
    action). See my full analysis:

    What Hope for Federal Anti-Spyware Legislation?
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/011905-1.html

    Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act
    http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.29:

    * Spyware legislation in the states. More than a dozen states are
    discussing legislation to try to stop spyware. Some of the states propose
    approaches I think would actually make a real difference. But nine states
    propose to copy the weak approach (indeed, most of the exact language)
    California adopted last year. My tabular listing and summaries:

    State Spyware Legislation
    http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/legislation/

    * Misleading installations continue. I could write a whole newsletter about
    misleading installation methods. (Indeed, a few would-be sponsors have
    recently encouraged me to do exactly that.) Most outrageous are
    installation with no notice or consent at all — like installations through
    browser or operating system security holes. But other installations claim
    to get user consent. Why would users consent to extra junk they don’t
    actually need? Some installations falsely claim to be “required” updates to
    Windows, Internet Explorer, or Media Player. Other installations harass
    users with repeated popups, leaving no clear choice but to say yes. Still
    others offer partial or euphemistic disclosures of their functions — for
    example, disclosing that they’ll show ads, but not mentioning that they’ll
    send users’ web browsing activity to remote servers for long-term storage
    and analysis.

    Spyware Installed through Security Holes
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/111804-1.html

    Media Files that Spread Spyware
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/010205-1.html

    I’ve seen all manner of spyware programs installed in the misleading ways
    described above, including programs from firms with major venture capital
    backing. See table of spyware investors, and the controversial
    characteristics of the companies they’ve invested in:

    Investors Supporting Spyware
    http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/investors/

    Last week I posted screenshots and videos showing how Google’s Blogspot
    service facilitates users’ infection with spyware: Google lets its bloggers
    embed JavaScript code that shows deceptive popups, attempting to install
    software onto users’ PCs.

    How Google’s Blogspot Helps Spread Unwanted Software
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/022205-1.html

    Then there’s VeriSign. VeriSign makes big money selling the digital
    certificates that IE requires before it shows ActiveX “drive-by”
    installation prompts. But I’ve seen little sign of any VeriSign procedures
    to stop its certificates from being used to trick or defraud users. For
    example, VeriSign-issued certificates sign installers that falsely claim to
    be security updates. VeriSign’s digital certificate page doesn’t even have
    a web form by which harmed consumers can report abuse.

    How VeriSign Could Stop Drive-By Downloads
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/020305-1.html

    * Claria. In November 2004, I published a critique of Claria’s license —
    its deficient format (missing section heading formatting) and one-sided
    substantive conditions (prohibiting “unauthorized” removal methods;
    prohibiting user inspection of Claria’s transmissions over users’ own
    Internet connections). Three months later, these defects remain.

    Gator’s EULA Gone Bad
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/112904-1.html

    Reed Freeman, Claria’s new Chief Privacy Officer, was recently appointed to
    a Department of Homeland Security committee on information privacy. There’s
    considerable irony here — after all, Claria has assembled what eWeek calls
    the seventh-largest decision-support database in the world, storing 12.1+
    terabytes of information about what web sites its users visit. Meanwhile,
    Freeman still has a lot to learn about Claria’s true practices: In a 2004
    interview, he made detailed and specific claims about Claria’s installation
    and removal procedures, but his claims are inconsistent with my hands-on
    testing of Claria software.

    Privacy Panel Membership Questioned
    http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7031597

    Claria’s Practices Don’t Meet Its Lawyers’ Claims
    http://www.benedelman.org/news/010405-1.html

    In closing, a bit on my plans for the coming months: More testing of spyware
    programs that claim affiliate commissions. (Nearly all affiliate merchants
    end up paying commissions to spyware companies: Spyware programs intercede
    to make it look like they deserve credit for users’ purchases.) More
    testing of “second-tier” spyware programs — whose installation methods are
    even more outrageous and whose effects are even more damaging. Measurement
    of the performance effects (speed reduction, bandwidth requirements, etc.)
    of selected spyware programs. Of course, more on misleading and deceptive
    installation methods.

    Let me offer a special welcome to the many readers who signed up since my
    last message. You’ll see that I only send these notes once every few
    months, lest I intrude in your inboxes too often. But please do feel free
    to get in touch with suggestions and requests.

    Ben Edelman
    benedelman.org

Viewing 1 post (of 1 total)